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COMMENTS
ABORTION STATUTES: ARE THEY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE? People
v. Belous. - Ca.2d, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969)
Defendant doctor referred a woman in her first trimester of
pregnancy to an abortionist, not licensed to practice medicine in
California, who performed an abortion. The defendant argued that the
woman's pregnant condition had endangered her life, but a jury found
otherwise, and convicted him of abortion in violation of California's
unamended criminal abortion statute' and of conspiracy to commit
abortion. 2 Defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court
arguing that the unamended abortion statute was unconstitutional.
Held: Conviction reversed. California's unamended criminal abortion
statute violates the Constitution because the standard "necessary to
preserve [the mother'sl life" is so vague and uncertain as to deprive
the defendant doctor of due process of law. Alternatively, the court
held that the standard, however interpreted, produced an unjustifiable
I LEcrN person .,ho provides. supplies, or administers to any woman, or procures any
woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or
other means whatever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the
same is neevsary to preserve her if. is punishable ....
CAL PENAL CODE § 274 (Deering Supp. 1961-69) (emphasis added).
Over the last three years, six states, including California, have extensively amended their old
abortion staiutes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (Deering Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
Coot § 25950-54 (Deering Supp. 1969); COLO REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (Supp. 1967); GA.
CODE A,', § 26-1101 to -1106 (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149E (Supp. 1968);
N.M STAT A\,N § 40A-5-1(C) (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
These statutes -ere fashioned essentially after the Model Penal Code, but differ in that they all
require that the abortion be performed in a licensed hospital after approval by a special hospital
board California is the only state among the six that does not allow an abortion if there is
substantial risk that the child %ill be born with a grave mental or physical defect. Under the
Model Penal Code:
A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is a
substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely inpair the physical or
mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All
illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for the purpose
of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed hospital
except in case of emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable....
No abortion shall be performed unless two physicians, one of whom may be the person
peTtoTmung the abortion, shall have certified in writing thie eireumsta= which, they
believe to justify the abortion, Such certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to
the hospital where is is to be performed and, in the case of abortion following felonious
intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or to the police ...
MoDw Plf&t CODE § 230,3(2, (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2 CAL lrNAI CODE * 182 (Deering Supp. 1961-69),
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infringement upon a pregnant woman's constitutional rights to life and
to choose to bear children.3
The court reasoned that the standard "necessary to preserve [the
mother's] life" had no clear meaning so that a doctor must speculate
when an abortion is authorized. And, because the doctor may be
convicted of criminal abortion if a jury finds the abortion not
authorized, he is denied his liberty without due process of law., Further,
the standard's vagueness produces an unconstitutional delegation of
decision-making powers to the doctor which, because the doctor must
determine the legality of an abortion at his own peril, denies the
pregnant woman her right to have an abortion.5
Moreover, under any interpretation of the standard, the pregnant
woman's Constitutional rights are invaded without justification. While
emphasizing it did not interpret the standard to require the threat of
imminent or certain death,6 the court nevertheless held that such an
interpretation would represent an invasion of both the woman's right
to life and to privacy in matters relating to marriage, family and sex,
as recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,7 not justified by a
countervailing interest of the state, particularly in the fetus.8
Furthermore, no meaning other than imminent or certain death will
convey to the medical profession any ascertainable limits to legal
abortions.'
Although the narrow holding- of Belous is only that the abortion
statute, because of vagueness, violates the doctor's right to due process
of law, the alternative holding places in question the validity of similar
legislation in 42 states"0 and strongly implies that prohibitive abortion
laws are per se an impermissible exercise of the state's police power."
3. People v. Belous, - Cal. 2d -, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
4. Id. at-., 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
5. Id. at , 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
6. Id. at-., 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
7. 381 U.S.479 (1965).
8. People v. Belous, - Cal.2d . . 458 P.2d 194, 199-203, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-
63 (1969).
9. Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 204-05, 80 Cal. Rptr. 364-65.
10. See Appendix, infra. The District of Columbia statute has already been declared
unconstitutional on reasoning similar to the Belous alternative holding. See note 46, infra, and
accompanying text,
1I. The court noted that, "The woman's right to life is involved because childbirth involves
risks of death," and then added, ". . . there may be doubts as to whether the state's interest
may ever justify requiring a woman to risk death." People v. Belous, - Cal.2d -, -,
-, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. 353, 359, 363 (1969). Since all childbirths involve
some risk of death, no abortion statute could be constitutional under this rationale.
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The critical elements in the decision are that (1) the rights of marital
privacy recognized in Griswold include a pregnant woman's right to
obtain an abortion, and (2) the state has no interest in a non-viable
fetus which justifies state infringement upon a pregnant woman's right
to obtain an abortion.' 2
As part of a couple's right to martial privacy Griswold recognized
their right to use contraceptives without state interference. 13 This right
is premised on the right of a married couple to control the size of their
family.' 4 Similarly, abortion is an exercise of a couple's right to control
family size because, like contraception, it is employed to prevent the
birth of a child. This is an important allegation (which Belous fails to
discuss) because approximately 90% of all abortions are performed on
married woman."5 Clearly a prohibitive abortion statute infringes upon
a woman's right not to bear children. Unless the state has a
recognizable interest in protecting the fetus, which it did not have in
the egg and spermatozoa prior to conception, upon which the state can
base its interference with marital privacy, the statute is
unconstitutional. 16
State protection of a fetus is premised on the classical theory that
the right of a fetus to be born takes precedence over all rights of the
12 The only interest the state might have in the fetus is protecting its right to life. See notes
15-38, inira. and accompanying text. And, any other interest the state might profess to have in
the question of whether a woman should be able to obtain an abortion, such as protecting the
mother's health or inhibiting immoral conduct, would not be sufficient basis to invade an
individual's constitutional right. See L. LADER, ABORTION 89-93 (1966); Lucas, Federal
('onstitutional Limitations On the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes,
46 N C.L REv 730, 750 (1968).
13 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U S. 479 (1965).
14 Grv Hold may be interpreted in a more narrow fashion, namely, that the state is merely
prohibited from interfering with a married couple's conjugal relations. However, the broader
interprcoAtlon appears to be the better interpretation. See Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra,
Contitutional Charter for Expanded Law of Privaev?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197, 212-13 (1965);
Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Law, Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 674
(1966)
15 L LSDER, ABORTION 159 (1966).
16 If, under an extension of Griswold, married couples are completely free to regulate the size
of their families, before the fetus becomes viable, should the state, nevertheless, be allowed to
regulate the choice of the unmarried pregnant woman regarding abortion because Griswold only
applies to marital privacy? To distinguish between a married and an unmarried pregnant woman
would be invidious discrimination violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. If the state has no interest in the non-viable fetus, there is no reason to make an
exception simply because the woman is unmarried. In fact, the unmarried pregnant woman would
be under a greater burden if she had to bear an unwanted child. Many sectors of society would
consider her an outcast, and she would find it difficult to support a child without the aid and
comfort ot a husband.
Vol. 1969: 4451
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pregnant woman except her right to life. 7 However, while some hold
the right to life exists from the time of conception, 8 others argue the
fetus has no rights at all until it becomes viable (i.e., is able to exist
outside the mother's womb).,9 Therefore, since the vast majority of
abortions occur in the first trimester of pregnancy before the fetus is
viable, 2 a determination of when the fetus attains the right to life
becomes crucial.
Arguably, the non-viable fetus' right to be born follows from certain
rights it has under the law, such as (1) the right to inherit property
from the moment of its conception,21 (2) the right to sue a tortfeasor
for negligently causing pre-natal injuries,22 and (3) the right of the
fetus' executor to bring a wrongful death action for its tortious
destruction. 23 Yet, these rights can be qualified. The fetus can inherit
property only if it is born alive;24 the same is true of its right to sue in
tort for pre-natal injuries;25 and its executors can sue for wrongful
death only if it was viable at the time it was negligently killed.2 1
Furthermore, the fetus' rights in tort are actually for the benefit of its
parents who sue the tortfeasor as guardian of the viable fetus and are
entitled to all damages recovered.2Y The Belous decision indicates that
17. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). This is the position taken by 80%
of the states which permit an abortion only when it is necessary to preserve or save the mother's
life. See Appendix, infra.
18. The Catholic Church takes this view. L. LADER, ABORTION 111-16 (1966); Note, Abortion
Legiflation: The Need for Reform, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1313, 1315-16 (1967).
19. See, e.g., L. LADER, ABORTION (1966); Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the
Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730 (1968).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21. See, e.g., In re Meyer's Estate, 119 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Surrogate Ct. 1953); In re Lee's Will,
203 Misc. 165, 116 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Surrogate Ct. 1952); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 126 (Reprint of Ist ed. 1966).
22. See, e.g., Benbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
23. See Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966).
24. See, e.g., In re Scanelli, 208 Misc. 804, 142 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Surrogate Ct. 1955); Note, In
Defense of the Right to Life: The Constitutionality of Therapeutic Abortion. I GA. L. Rev. 693,
700 (1967); Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 10-12, People v. Betous - Cal.2d - 458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
25. See Carroll v. Skloff, 414 Pa. 625, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Hatala v.
Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1965); Peterson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
175 Ohio St. 551, 197 N.E.2d 194 (1964); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 853 (1965). "A child is regarded
as viable from somewhere between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of pregnancy."
Note, In Defense of the Right to Life: The Constitutionality of Theraupeutic Abortion, I GA. L.
REv. 693, 701 (1967).
27. People v. Belous, - Cal. 2d -, - n. 12, 458 P.2d 194, 202-03 n. 12, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 362-63 n. 12 (1969).
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these fetal "rights" are non-existent or, in any event, insufficient to
justify the state in limiting the woman's constitutional rights in order
to protect the fetus."'
Even the cases which specifically state that the non-viable fetus has
the right to be born except when the mother's life is endangered 29 are
insufficient support because the facts in these cases are not concerned
with a non-viable fetus. Rather, the child was either alive or viable at
the time of the suit,3 0 or the purpose of the questioned medical
treatment was to save the life of the mothef3 or of the child when it
was born alive.3 1
Although Belous distinguishes most of these cases,- they can all be
distinguished simply because none of them are concerned with the
constitutionality of abortion statutes. In these cases, the mothers
wanted the fetus to be born while the issue in an abortion controversy
is whether the fetus should be born against the mother's wishes.34
Significantly, Belous stresses that it would be inconsistent to
judicially recognize the right of a non-viable fetus to be born when the
legislature has never classified the intentional and unjustfiable
destruction of the non-viable fetus as murder.35 Only when the fetus has
28 Id at -, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
2N. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp.
v Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537. cert. dented, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Hoener v. Bertinato,
67 N.J Super, 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961).
30. Gleitman v Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22. 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mere. Hosp.
v Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
31. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied,
377 U S 985 (1964).
32 Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super, 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961).
33 People v. Belous, - Cal. 2d -, - n. 12, 458 P.2d 194, 202-03 n. 12, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 362-63 n. 12 (1969).
34 Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crises; Therapeutic Abortion and the Law;
Some News Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 660 (1966).
35 People v. Belous, - Cal. 2d . _ 458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363
(1969). Only a few states consider a successful non-viable fetal abortion to be as serious a crime
as manslaughter, and even some of these statutes require the fetus to be "quick." ALASKA
STAT 11 15.060 (1962) (manslaughter); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.10 (1959) (manslaughter);
Miss CODE ANN § 2222 (1956) (homicide if a quick child); Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.100 (1959)
(manslaughter if a quick child); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.40, 45 (McKinney 1967). "Quickening
is that stage of gestation, usually sixteen to twenty weeks after conception, when the woman feels
the first fetal movement." Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. Cllrm. L.C. & P.S. 84
n I (1968), Only Georgia considers the willful destruction of a quick child, in certain instances,
to be a capital offense.
The willful' killing of an unborn child so far developed as to be ordinarily called
"quick," by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted
Washington University Open Scholarship
450 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 445
become viable will the law regard its intentional destruction as
murder."
A medical approach to the problem reveals a significant difference
between the viable and non-viable fetus. Ancient jurists recognized this
fact; under the common law, prior to 1803, it was not a crime to abort
a fetus before "quickening. ' 37 During the first trimester of pregnancy,
the life in the mother's womb is an embryo and it is not until after
three months that this life starts to develop human form (the fetal
stage).3 8 After six weeks of pregnancy, it is almost impossible to
distinguish a human embryo from that of any other mammal whether
it be a mouse or an elephant.39 Thus, "[i]t is simply blinking at reality
to call the embryo a human being, just as it is to call the outline of a
brief, a brief, or that blueprint of a house, a house."" To say that an
embryo is equivalent to a viable fetus, in the eyes of the law, is to fly
in the face of medical science. Medical science gives scant support to
the proposition that a non-viable fetus is a human being.
Thus, just as the state cannot prohibit an attempt to prevent the
joining of an egg and a spermatazoa, so it cannot sanctify the two cells
immediately after they join and accord them, over the woman's
objection, the rights of a human being.4 Such a sanctification would
be a subjective belief of religious character which only a minority of
Americans hold, 42 and there is no valid state interest in the
implementation of a minority religious belief sufficient to serve as a
basis for interference with substantial individual rights. 3 If the state
has no interest in preventing an abortion immediately after conception,
in the death of such mother, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, as the
jury may recommend.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-992 1A (Supp. 1969).
36. People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
37. Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. CRIt. L.C. & P.S. 84 (1968). "Life is the
immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in con-
templation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."
I.W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS Or ENGLAND 125 (Reprint of 1st ed. 1966).
38. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 10 n. 17, People v. Belous, - Cal.2d -, 458 P.2d
194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
39. Id. at 23 n. 26.
40. Id. at 23-24.
41. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State
Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730, 760 (1968).
42. For example, the Catholic belief that the soul enters the living tissue at the moment of
conception. See L. LADER, ABORTION 111-16 (1966).
43. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State
Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 760 (1968).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss4/5
ABORTION STATUTES
when, if ever, does it acquire such an interest? Certainly no one can
precisely pinpoint when a fetus is sufficiently human to be accorded all
the rights of a post-birth human, but present case law and medical
science apparently recognize viability as the crucial stage after which
a fetus should be accorded some rights."
Because California had amended its abortion statute prior to
Belous," the decision did not create a legal vacuum. However, in other
states, a declaration that its abortion statute is unconstitutional would
leave that state without any abortion statute. Thus, all abortions would
be legal if performed by a licensed physician, which is certainly a
strong argument against striking down the statute. Nonetheless, two
months after Belous, the court in United States v. Boyd 6 declared the
District of Columbia abortion statute unconstitutional under the
rationale of the Belous alternative holding. Most significantly, the
Boyd court asked the Supreme Court of the United States to allow an
appeal.47 Perhaps at that level, a thorough consideration of the
opposing rights of the pregnant woman and her fetus will be made, and
a nationwide rule on abortion thus established.
44 See note 15-38, supra, and accompanying text.
45 See note I, supra.
46 United States v. Boyd, Criminal No. 1587-69 (D.D.C., filed Nov. (2, 1969). The District
of Columbia statute permitted an abortion only if ". . . necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life or health .. " D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
47 United States v. Boyd, Criminal No. 1587-69 at 6 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 12, 1969).
Vol. 1969: 445)
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 445
APPENDIX
States Which Permit Abortions Only When They Are Necessary to
Preserve or Save the Woman's Life.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 53-29 (1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.10 (1965); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 768-7 (1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-410, 21-437 (1964);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.020 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 51 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 617.18 (1964); MISi. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1968) (now
includes rape); Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 94401 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, 28405 (1965);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.220, 201.120 (1967); N.H. REB. STAT.
ANN. §§ 585:12, 585:13 (1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05
(McKinney 1967); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 12-25-01, -02 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 861 (Supp. 1969-70); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82,-83
(1962); S.D. Com. LAW ANN. § 22-17-1 (1969): S.C. Com. LAW
ANN. § 22-17-1 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-301, 39-302 (1956);
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 1191-1196 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1958) VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1961); W. VA.
CODE ANN. 61-2-8 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); Wyo.
STATANN. § 6-77 (1957).
A. Louisiana prohibits all abortions without exception. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (Supp.
1969).
B. Three states prohibit "illegal abortions." MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 272 § 19 (1968);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953); PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963).
C. Hawaii recently passed a new abortion statute at the time this edition went to
press. The new statute allows greater latitude for the performance of abortions.
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